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Abstract: 
The  paper  identifies  three  dominant  traditions  in  the  theorisation  of  language 
responsible  for  a  19
th  century  bias  towards  formalisation.  What  is  glaringly 
missing, the paper suggests, is iconicity in Peirce’s sense. This is seen as the main 
reason  why  our  existing  paradigms  have  failed  to  address  the  crucial  relation 
between language and perception. First, I offer a series of justifications in support 
of  a  perceptually  oriented  theory  of  natural  language.  Second,  I  present 
redefinitions of the linguistic sign, meaning, reference, deixis and other aspects of 
language as necessary preconditions for a reconciliation of percepts and verbal 
expressions. Such a theory hinges on the claim that culturally saturated discourse 
can  function as  it  does  only  because  the  schematic  skeleton  of  its  signifiers  is 
brought to life in each meaning event by a socially monitored process of activation 
by iconic, nonverbal semiosis. 
 
KEYWORDS:  iconicity,  nonverbal  semiosis,  motivated  signified,  meaning  as 
intersemiotic  event,  syntactic  circularity,  arbitrariness,  eidos,  percept-  concept 
continuum,  non-vulgar  naturalism,  heterosemiotic  relations,  corporeal  turn, 
referential background, implicit deixis, sufficient semiosis.  
 
Introduction 
It seems scandalous, does it not, that the linguistic and philosophical paradigms that 
inform our dominant discourses on natural language should still be held hostage by 
a powerful late nineteenth century bias, which for a lack of a better term I call 
mathematisation.  From  Frege  to  Quine,  Grice,  Davidson  and  Searle  in  analytical 
philosophy,  from  Saussure  to  poststructuralist  linguistics,  as  well  as  in  the 
foundational texts of phenomenology, we face this longing for the crystalline clarity 
of a logos of natural language that would provide the key to a new science. Having 
chosen the double path of radical generalisation and formalisation, each of these 
enterprises, which are otherwise quite distinct from and often even hostile to one  
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another, has performed fundamental reductions on the nature of natural language 
with  profound  and  not  entirely  innocent  consequences.  Not  that  many  of  the 
theories indebted to those founding fathers have failed to produce persuasive and 
often elegant explanatory schemata for language. Quite the contrary. If anything, 
they have been too successful as accepted bodies of knowledge if what we want is a 
‘thick’ description of what actually goes on in natural languages. Especially when we 
ask how perceptual signification, which preceded the invention of language by a 
long shot and is still forcefully present in human semiosis, relates to and survives in 
language we look in vain for any serious attempt at providing an answer.  
In Frege’s case, what has not been captured by the critical radar are three 
fundamental  interventions  with  massive  consequences:  (1)  his  conflation  of  two 
kinds of sense, the sense of arithmetic and geometrical relations with the sense of 
natural language; (2) his definition of meaning as ‘pure’ or definitionally governed 
thought; and (3) his elimination of iconicity from the notion of linguistic meaning. 
Undisturbed by the passage of time of more than a century since Frege’s claims 
made in 1892, analytical philosophy is still working with these foundational tools. 
(Frege 1892; Ruthrof 1997:59-76) 
The  father  of  modern  linguistics,  Ferdinand  de  Saussure,  cannot  be  held 
entirely responsible for the lecture notes that were later transformed into the Cours 
de linguistique général, the foundational text of structuralist linguistics. (Saussure 
1916)  And  yet,  the  following  observations  are  hardly  undermined  by  what  is 
available to us in his other writings. Of particular relevance here are (1) his radical 
arbitrariness thesis; (2) his argument that meaning is constituted by the differential 
relations of signifiers; and (3) his emphasis on syntax and the signifier at the expense 
of a merely minimal definition of the signified, a situation that, from the very outset, 
heralded  its  gradual  demise  to  the  point  where  the  signified  has  disappeared 
altogether  amongst  some  of  his  post-structuralist  successors.  This  leaves  the 
signifier  to  carry  semantic  load,  which  violates  Saussure’s  insistence  on  the  
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necessary simultaneity of signifier and signified in the production of the meaningful 
linguistic sign.  
In  spite  of  the  fruitful  tension  between  the  early  mathematically  oriented 
Husserl and his later exploration of the Lebenswelt, Husserl never quite abandoned 
his belief that the meaning of natural language terms was well described as eidetic, 
which the majority of Husserl scholars read as a formal notion. This is surprising if 
we remind ourselves that Husserl felt as early as in the Ideas that the noetic side of 
investigations in matters social and cultural, such as the process of modifications in 
the act of communication,  were more important than its fleeting noematic results; 
(Husserl 1913) that he had the enormously fertile insight of appresentations as the 
habitual as well as creative filling of non-present aspects of reality; (Husserl 1931) in 
addition  to  his  suspicion  that  the  description  of  the  Lebenswelt  appeared  more 
promising if approached by the tools of typifications than by the idea of an eidetic 
geometry  of  experiences.  Such  findings  were  later  to  be  explored  more  fully 
especially  by  Roman  Ingarden  (1973a;  1973b)  and Alfred  Schütz  (1959),  without 
however being able to excise Husserl’s eidetic starting point entirely from the study 
of natural language.  
What is striking in our tour de force summary so far is that the three founders 
of  the  discourses  about  natural  language  we  are  dealing  with  today  share  the 
conviction that formal relations are at the heart of language itself and that therefore 
formal tools will yield the most appropriate characterisation of what goes on when 
we speak. What often happens with such enterprises is not so much that one cannot 
in principle reduce the richness of phenomena to the tightness of formal structures; 
rather, in any such attempt there always arise two fundamental dangers: one, that 
we have cast our net of inquiry too narrowly and, as a result, what we set out to 
describe turns out to have been only a part of a larger whole and, two, any process 
of formal reduction is a one way street: we can never reconstruct from its results 
the richness of its phenomenal starting point – natural language as social event.   
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It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise  then  that  perception,  out  of  which  natural 
language evolved in the dimness of our hominid past, finds no room in the various 
and  quite  different  analyses  spawned  by  those  three  branches  of  inquiry.  For 
perception, made up as it is by such heterosemiotic sign systems as olfactory, tactile, 
gustatory, kinetic, proximic, thermal, gravitational, haptic, visual and other forms of 
readings of the Umwelt and ourselves, as well as their intersemiotic combinations 
into the constitution of the human world, does itself not readily invite any formal 
reduction. At the same time and given the available evolutionary picture of semiosis, 
from  electromagnetic  radiation  out  of  which  organisms  construe  their  worlds  in 
order to optimise survival, to perceptual experience, to language and, ultimately, to 
formal  codes, the  relation  between language and  perception  remains  a  pressing 
concern. How then, I ask, can we get the question of the relation between the two 
sign  systems,  of  verbal  expressions  and  percepts,  back  into  our  theorisation  of 
natural language? And how, given the obvious hostility in the dominant literature to 
such  a  question,  can  we  justify  any  attempt  at  laying  the  foundations  for  a 
perceptually oriented theory of language? 
Against this background the paper discusses a number of perspectives which I 
suggest can be used to shore up the perception and language project. The main 
encouragement for this undertaking comes from recent findings in neuroscience and 
neurolinguistics,  which  together  indicate  quite  forcefully  some  form  of  linkage 
between the sensor-motor system in the human brain and culturally circumscribed 
natural  language  activities  in  the  mind.  (Lüdtke  2006;  Lakoff  and  Gallese  2005; 
Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Johnson and Lakoff 1999; Fauconnier 1997; Varela, 
Thompson,  and  Rosch  1993;  Turner  1991)    It  would  seem  that  such  naturalist 
challenges to existing explanatory paradigms, at least in their non-vulgar forms, can 
no longer be ignored in the theorisation of language. The task before us, then, is to 
inquire  into  the  relation  between  language  and  perception to  the  extent  that it 
affects the definition of the linguistic sign itself and the role signifier and signified  
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play in it, descriptions of linguistic meaning, reference and deixis (as well as their 
untheorised extensions such as referential background and implicit deixis), speech 
acts and presuppositions, and other language features. The second part of the paper 
sketches some of the consequences of the ‘corporeal turn’ (Ruthrof 1997) and its 
perceptual point of departure.  
The theoretical debts to be acknowledged here are too numerous to list in 
detail. Foremost, though, I must mention Peircean semiotics and his insistence on 
the  importance  of  iconicity  for  the  human  interpretant:  “Every  assertion  must 
contain an icon or a set of icons, or else must contain signs whose meaning is only 
explicable by icons” (CP 1.158). I am indebted to Husserlian phenomenology and its 
extensions,  especially  in  Ingarden  and  Schütz;  Heidegger’s  elaboration  of  the 
meaning  as  an  interpretive  event  in  even  its  minimal  as-structure;  analytical 
philosophy for many of its tools even when this equipment is used to dislodge some 
of their favourite positions; a broad sweep of literature in neurolingusitics; Kant’s 
inferential realism, which is grounded both in what he calls objective reality and the 
mechanisms of human understanding, as well as his analysis of complex judgments; 
and above all a Peirce inspired commitment to the sign, stretching from the minimal 
alquid pro aliquo to a sign notion as “something that stands as something to some 
organism  in  certain  respects  and  under  specific  circumstances”.  Furthermore,  I 
collapse  Peirce’s  iconic  and  indexical  signs  into  iconicity  on  the  grounds  that 
indexical signs typically rely on iconic traces to be realised and so can be regarded as 
indirect iconic signs. At the same time, both are sharply distinguished from symbolic 
signs in that the latter require of necessity the radical reduction to formal emptiness 
of all referential and deictic features. Given the short space of a paper, I will make 
no  claims  here  beyond  offering  a  compressed,  programmatic  overview  of  the 
project.  
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Justifications 
Underlying the search for justification are a number of questions likely to shed light 
on the extent to which one could claim that perception or its traces play a role in 
natural  language.  Is  language  well  described  by  Lev  Vygotsky  as  a  “generalised 
reflection of reality”? (Vygotsky 1962:153) If so, what sort of generalisation are we 
dealing with and what degrees of schematisation are operative in language? Are we 
dealing  with  sensuous  abstractions  and  schematised  percepts  or  are  natural 
languages no more than systems of empty ideations? (Cassirer 1957:331) Or does 
each language perhaps form a continuum of meaning events stretching from highly 
iconic realisations to full formalisation? And if so, what role if any does perception 
play in the iconic portion of the continuum? To answer such queries, we first need 
to locate language in its broader evolutionary frame. 
 
(1) Natural language in the information-control continuum 
From its earliest beginnings and from an evolutionary and autopoietic perspective, 
human semiosis can be regarded as an information- control continuum. I am using 
the  phrase  to  emphasize  the  difference  between  the  way  the  human  organism 
absorbed information from its Umwelt at an early stage and the way humans have 
learned to control information in advanced societies. This difference seems to me an 
indication of an extended spectrum from electromagnetic radiation, a tiny selection 
of which was able to be transformed by our distant hominid ancestors for survival in 
a non-conscious manner, to perceptual experience, perceptual proto-language, to 
language, and such language derivatives as technical and formal languages, up to 
the binary-digital code in the logic gates of our computing equipment. Using a very 
broad brush, such a continuum could be sketched thus. 
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The Physical World  
    subatomic events      electromagnetic radiation 
    particles    ￿    ‘surface intensities’           ￿ 
The Organic World  
    ‘transducers’    neurological    colours 
    (senses)    processes    objects, tastes, smells 
                        temperature, pressure  
The Human World – two kinds of perception  
  ￿  perception – iconic readings     ￿   perceptual experience     ￿ 
    Vorstellung               iconic readings and concepts 
    (non-conscious)          Vorstellung (conscious) 
NATURAL LANGUAGE      ￿ 
    Linguistic sign = arbitrary signifier + motivated signified 
        Signified = iconic readings + forms of schematisation (concept) 
(metaphoricity; denotation; full referring use; explicit and implicit deixis) 
Technical Languages 
  ￿  Technical languages  ￿    formal languages    ￿    Boolean code 
    (limited, definitional              (zero reference;         (zero reference; 
    denotation; reference;          neutralised deixis)          zero deixis; mere  
                 neutralised deixis)                        instantiation). 
Feedback Relations 
    From perceptual experience onwards every stage feeds back into  
    all previous stages. 
 
(2) The semiotic location of natural language 
From  this  rough sketch  it  appears  that  natural  language is  sandwiched  between 
perception and mathematisation. There is little doubt in the literature that this is 
indeed the case. Why then, we should ask, is it that the vast majority of language 
studies take its cues from the perspectives of its derivatives? Doesn’t this mean that 
we will primarily find things in natural language that have already been derived from  
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it in the very construction of those reduced technical and formal languages? As I will 
argue, it should be obvious that if we view natural language primarily from the rear 
view mirror of semiotic evolution, the results are bound to be reductive.  
 
(3) Mathematisation comes at a price.  
It is of course a merit rather than flaw of mathematisation that it is reductive. That 
is, if it is applied to goals where reduction produces an advantage. But there are 
many areas of human endeavour where the application of formalisation results in 
losses rather than gains. Perhaps there is no deep DNA level to be found in natural 
language. Perhaps it is exactly at the rich surface of language where we need to 
concentrate our research. And indeed, a vast number of linguistic enterprises are 
fruitfully addressing themselves to that level. Yet if the most appropriate level at 
which language study can be pegged is its rich cultural, linguistic surface rather than 
any  deep  structure,  then  does  not  what  we  could  observe  get  lost  by  the  very 
application of techniques of formalisation? In  any  propositional reduction of the 
kind  we  find  in  generative  grammar  what  gets  lost  is  what  for  the  pragmatist 
Foucault, for example, is the analysis of enunciative modalities, which play such a 
crucial role in the description of  what is a statement (Foucault 1978). In full-blown 
formalisation,  furthermore,  we  miss  out  not  only  reference  but  referential 
background and implicit or cultural deixis, essential forms of signification that I will 
address in the second half of the paper. 
 
(4) Syntactic circularity 
Imagine  a  situation  in  which  an  English  native  speaker  has  been  given  a  Malay 
phrase book and a few basic pronunciation rules and has been asked to read aloud 
what she sees. A Malay student passing the room hears what she is saying and 
thinks, ‘Wow, her command of Malay is excellent’. The student in the room is very 
much  in  the  situation  in  which  we  would  all  find  ourselves  if  the  structuralist  
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definition of meaning as ‘effect of the differential relations amongst signifiers’ were 
indeed an appropriate description of semantic-pragmatic events. To illustrate the 
same point more starkly.  
Assume this to be a natural language L: ‘glob’ unlike ‘nin’ unlike ‘fon’ unlike 
‘jidd’ unlike ‘reb’ … And: ‘glob’ like ‘fuddom’ and like ‘rike’.  Do we now know what 
‘glob’ means? Hardly. The main reason for the failure of meaning to take place here 
is that we have not been able to exit the syntactic system of signifiers in order to 
associate  it  systematically  with  a  second  order  system  called  in  some  theories 
‘reference’ and in the theory advocated here ‘nonverbal signification’. In Peircean 
terms,  if  we  were  unable  to  translate  the  merely  symbolic,  that  is,  empty  and 
‘arbitrary’ signifiers into iconic signs, that is, signs that act as semiotic reference to 
our world, we would remain in a circle of formal symbolicity. This is precisely the 
point where structuralist linguistics needs the kind of assistance afforded by Peirce’s 
insistence on iconicity. And if there is iconicity in natural language, where could it 
have come from? Where else than from perception.  
What may surprise some readers is that even Michael Halliday’s functional 
linguistics, in spite of its many and rich accomplishments, has not been able to free 
itself from the problematic of syntactic circularity. It seems to me that he commits 
himself  too  readily  to  saying  that  while  the  linkage  between  language  and  the 
nonverbal well describes what happens in childhood, adult language users behave 
fundamentally  syntactically.  (Halliday  1975:142)  This  leaves  one  wondering  how 
adults can cope with the massive increase in linguistically coded knowledge about 
the world as an ongoing process. Without systemic access to nonverbal sign systems 
his ‘social semiotic’ remains semantically and pragmatically impoverished. (Halliday 
1978)  
 
(6) Arbitrariness thesis  
Signs vol. 3: pp. 1-29, 2009 
ISSN: 1902-8822 
10
Because  linguistic  signifiers  are  ‘arbitrary’,  says  Saussure,  therefore  the  linguistic 
sign  as  a  whole  is  likewise  arbitrary.  No  doubt  this  kind  of  reasoning  has  been 
recognized by many readers as a pars pro toto fallacy. Clearly, the signified has not 
been shown to be arbitrary. And if it is not arbitrary, there is a very good chance that 
it is motivated. And indeed it is. When members of different semiotic communities, 
say, Chinese, French, German, and English meet and by ostension identify the same 
part of their bodies, say their big toes, the arbitrariness of the signifiers ‘wode da 
muze’, ‘mon gross orteil’, ‘meine grosse Zehe’ and ‘my big toe’ is obvious and hardly 
disputable.  Not so  with  the  signifieds.  It  would  require  an  elaborate  and  hardly 
persuasive argument to make a case for saying that the signified, Saussure’s ‘image’ 
or ‘concept’, in each case was likewise arbitrary. Not only are the four signifieds the 
same, barring the further cultural associations that each speaker would be able to 
add  to  his  expression,  this  very  sameness  is  the  ground  on  which  translation 
between different natural languages is possible at all. Because as human being we 
share a basic physiognomy, the sum of nonverbal signs that make up our physical 
appearance,  we  also  share  a  tertium  comparationis  that  permits  the  gradual 
construction of a functional ‘translation manual’. Quine is quite wrong in his claim of 
‘untranslatability’ and ‘indeterminacy of reference’, which turn out to be no more 
than a result of the narrowness of his linguistic frame of inquiry and the elimination 
of time. (Quine 1997:93; Ruthrof 2005:391) Had he chosen a broadly semiotic frame 
and  the  continuum  of  sign  exchange,  including  nonverbal  semiosis,  his  problem 
would not have arisen in the first place. To return to our four big toes, which provide 
the perceptual ground on which they are able to perform their compatible semantic-
pragmatic acts of cognition, the signified is reasonably well secured as a result of 
perception and language having been associated. Expressed semiotically, a meaning 
event has occurred as the consequence of a successful realisation of a linguistic 
schema by way of iconic signs. I further suggest that in the absence of any actual 
perception, iconicity in Vorstellung replaces the perceptual starting point.  
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(7) Neurolinguistics 
A quite different and positive justification can be gleaned from neuroscience and 
neurolinguistics, especially the work that characterises the Lakoff School. If we leave 
aside their unnecessary and quite flawed critique of ‘Western thought’, we are able 
find valuable support for a perceptually oriented theory of language in the notion of 
‘neural  concepts’  and  their  well  documented  observations  about  the  very  likely 
linkages  between  conceptual  metaphors  and  the  sensori-motor  system  in  the 
human brain. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 19). This is of considerable importance for 
any argument in favour of an alignment between the semiosis that exists between 
world and brain, on the one hand, and the semiotic relations between brain and 
mind or consciousness, on the other. Perception clearly straddles both relations, 
non-conscious perception providing the basic transformations for the survival of the 
organism  and  perceptual  experience  permitting  conscious  intervention  in  our 
Umwelt.  Language  as  an  economizing  matrix  superimposed  on  perceptual 
experience, then could be argued to draw substantially on its perceptual resources 
of necessity. What remains to be accomplished is the not so easy task of showing 
precisely how this could occur.  
 
(8) The percept-concept continuum 
We  find  in  the  literature  what  I  regard  as  too  sharp  a  distinction  between  the 
specificity of percepts and the generality of concepts. Derek Bickerton, in his two 
intriguing volumes on the evolution of language, The Origins of Language (Bickerton 
1981) and Species and Language (Bickerton 1990), notes that “in the sense that 
perception  in  the  frog  is  generalized,  it  is  like  conceptualization”  (Bickerton 
1981:222). But at the same time he hangs on to the idea that “until a percept – the 
image of a particular entity on a particular occasion – can be replaced at will by a 
concept – the image of a class of entities, divorced from all particular instantiations  
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of that class – then the power to predict is limited” (ibid.: 227). He also still assumes 
that “concepts are delimited in terms of one another; percepts only in terms of 
themselves” (ibid.: 231). More recent research into images and percepts however 
has shown that the assumed radical break between percepts and concepts, as far as 
it is based on specificity one the one hand and generality on the other, turns out to 
be a dubious belief. What in fact appears to be the case is that the reduction of the 
specificity of information has started long before the alleged, radical differentiation 
between specific percepts and generalised concepts could have developed. 
A case in point is the kind of reduction of information the human organism 
performs in the process of vision. The 100 million or so light-sensing cells of the 
human eye are connected with the brain by only 1 million fibres, which means that 
“each incoming image must therefore be reduced in complexity by a factor of 100” 
(Lakoff  and  Johnson  1999:18).  This  means  not  only  that  long  before  the  mind 
becomes conscious of visual semiosis a generalising reduction of visual information 
has  already  been  performed  by  the  human  body,  but  also  that  all  consequent 
operations  in  consciousness  can  only  produce  further  generalising  modifications. 
The percept, then, is anything but specific. Very much the same observations can be 
made about all other semiotic processes associated with our senses. In other words, 
nothing we experience is, strictly speaking, ‘specific’.  The exciting conclusion we 
must draw from this is that both percept and concept need to be located on the very 
same  continuum  of  minimal  to  greater  and  greater  generality,  on  which  the 
formation of language is perhaps the most fascinating stage. This has implications 
for the kind of assumption Bickerton is forced to make that there must have been a 
‘mutational’ break between the stage of a perceptual proto-language and the much 
more sophisticated syntax-determined languages of our more immediate ancestors. 
(Bickerton 1990) Such speculations become quite unnecessary if we stay with the 
more  likely  idea  of  an  extended  continuum  in  which  a  perceptual  proto-syntax,  
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dictated by the semiotic processes of the human senses, gradually evolves into more 
and more complex syntactic constellations.  
 
(9) Moral justification 
My  last  choice  of  a  justification  for  the  legitimacy  of  proposing  a  perceptually 
oriented  theory  of  language  lacks  the  kind  of  scientific  flavour  of  some  of  the 
previous arguments. It has no more to offer than a certain moral appeal in the sense 
that if we cannot account in our existing theories for the complexities of human 
perception  and  Vorstellung,  but  eliminate  them  as  murky  and  unimportant  side 
effects, we are not only forgetting our place in the general picture of evolution but 
produce a view of language that is less than human.    
     On the assumption that at least some of the above perspectives are persuasive in 
lieu of a justification for the legitimacy of an attempt at a theoretical reconciliation 
of  natural  language  and  perception,  I  now  offer  the  paper’s  central  hypothesis. 
‘Language is a set of rules for imagining and acting in the world’. But how, the reader 
will rightly question, does such a phrasing pave the way for an argument in favour of 
the claim that perception has somehow survived in language? The missing link here 
is  Vorstellung,  understood  as  modification  of perception in  consciousness  rather 
than  as  ‘mental  representation’.  In  this  sense  Vorstellung  replaces  the  English 
‘imagination’ as less tied to visual signs, while at the same time encompassing the 
entire range of thought scenarios from the most realist mental replication to the 
wildest science fiction fantasies. In this modified guise, perception, the hypothesis 
claims, is a sine qua non of the semantic-pragmatic side of natural language. How 
this can be argued will be the task of the second part of the paper.  
Before we get there, I conclude this section by asking whether my hypothesis 
could in some way be accommodated by the three traditional approaches sketched 
in this paper. The summary answer is ‘not without serious modification of some of 
their axioms’. In analytical language philosophy, meaning as definitionally governed  
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‘pure thought’ would result in having learned to cash in the Chinese signifier ‘guanxi’ 
with a definitional description such as ‘personal relations based on trust’ or ‘milk’ by 
a string of other signifiers of the kind we find in a dictionary. Not only is this a very 
unlikely  mapping  of  what  occurs  in  meaning  events,  we  have  also  failed  to  get 
anywhere near the requirement of Vorstellung, the semiotic process of perceptual 
modification. The same problem dogs Husserl’s meaning as eidos. Nor, as we have 
tried  to  show,  can  we  retrieve  a  quasi-perceptually  conceived  meaning  from 
Saussure’s  syntactic  circularity.  There  lies  a  not  so  subtle  irony  in  the  fact  that 
Vorstellung, in the iconic sense used here, is nowhere to be found in syntax on its 
own, while Vorstellung is implicitly stipulated in Saussure’s minimal definition of the 
signified as ‘concept’ and ‘image’.  
As is to be expected, the semantic solutions offered in the three paradigms 
differ  according  to  their  foundational  assumptions  about  language.  In  analytical 
language philosophy, meaning is cashed in by reference to the objective, ‘external 
world’.  (Devitt  and Sterelny  1991:  28).  Such a  move  conceals a  serious  semiotic 
confusion between a signification system, such as language, and the objectivities of 
a naturalistically conceived ‘world’. What is missing in such accounts is a tertium 
comparationis. The analytically stipulated ‘world’ needs to be semiotised to permit 
any  alignment  with  language.  Structuralist  linguistics  suffers  from  the  opposite, 
idealist flaw. The world is assumed to be always already incorporated into the circle 
of differential relations of the signifiers of a language. How it gets there, though, 
remains a mystery. In early phenomenology, meaning remains hardly affected by 
‘occasion  meaning’  and  other  noetic  modifications.  (Ruthrof  1992:65-77) 
Fortunately, amongst Husserl’s successors, meaning is constituted by either filling 
the schematic nature of language by way of appresentations and according to the 
social purpose of texts, such as by ‘concretisations’ in Ingarden (Ingarden 1973a; 
1973b) or by aligning language with other typifications systems. (Schütz 1959) With  
Signs vol. 3: pp. 1-29, 2009 
ISSN: 1902-8822 
15
these  moves,  Ingarden  and  Schütz  opened  promising  pathways  out  of  the 
definitional and syntactic maze.   
 
Consequences 
In order to account for perception in language in its modified form of Vorstellung 
stipulated in our hypothesis, a number of more or less radical redefinitions need to 
be  undertaken.  Viewing  perception  and  its  mental  variant,  Vorstellung,  from  a 
Peircean perspective we find ourselves directed to the central notion of iconicity. To 
repeat one of Peirce’s core convictions, “every assertion must contain an icon or a 
set of icons, or else must contain signs whose meaning is only explicable by icons” 
(CP  1.158).  In  other  words,  for  something  to  make  human  meaning,  it  must 
somehow be imaginable  as  a version of  our  world.  We can test  this claim by  a 
modest thought experiment with the differences between our experience of speed, 
acceleration,  and  jerk,  or  accelerated  acceleration.  While  their  mathematical 
representation can be extended indefinitely, our ability to imagine such experiences 
ends fairly early in the series. Iconicity is fundamentally circumscribed by the human 
organism,  while  symbolicity  is  unencumbered  by  such  perceptual  constraints. 
Applied to the description of natural language, one could surmise then that every 
single language term, including function words, somehow still carries traces of their 
semiotic antecedents in perception (cf. Sweetser 1990). With this assumption as my 
point of departure, I propose the following redefinitions. 
At the centre of a perceptually oriented theory of language must be placed an 
iconically redefined linguistic sign. A comparison with Saussure’s original definition 
will show how this can be achieved. 
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Linguistic sign 
de Saussure’s schema 
 Linguistic sign  
          (arbitrary) 
 
Signifier (expression) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Signified (meaning)  
(increasingly neglected) 
Arbitrary 
------------------------------------------------- 
Effect  of  differential,  syntactic,  
arbitrary relations 
 
 
Revised schema: iconic materials in the revised linguistic sign 
Linguistic sign 
   
Signifier (expression) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Signified (meaning) 
 
arbitrary:  result of historical reduction 
------------------------------------------------- 
Iconically motivated; refined by syntax 
Components  of  the 
Signified 
     (motivated) 
content: 
nonverbal iconic materials 
modified in Vorstellung 
(perceptually motivated)  
form: regulative concept 
(socially motivated) 
Sources  Neural functions, perception  Speech community 
Communication                                              sufficient semiosis 
 
 
We can now redefine the linguistic sign as follows. 
The linguistic sign is  partly conventional  and  partly motivated. It is  a  compound 
entity made up of an ‘arbitrary’ or conventional signifier and a motivated signified 
which consists of conceptually regulated iconic materials activated in Vorstellung. 
Such materials are available to us in terms of heterosemiotic, nonverbal signs, such 
as olfactory, auditory, kinetic, proximic, thermal, tactile, gustatory, visual and other 
‘readings’ of the world.  
Having redefined the signified as motivated and as a combination of iconic 
materials and regulative concepts, the next most important step is to sum up the 
way concepts do their work. Unlike perceptual concepts, which by now we can be 
pretty  certain  we  share  with  non-languaging  animals,  and  in  contrast  with  the  
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standard  literature  on  concepts,  (Margolis  and  Laurence  1999;  Fodor  1998)  the 
concepts of language are regarded here as social rules for ordering iconic materials 
which we have learned to activate when we hear (or read) a specific linguistic sound 
sequence.  Seen  from  this  angle,  one  can  distinguish  the  following  regulating 
functions in the concept: directionality,   which points our attention in a certain 
mental or physical direction; quality, which  sums up the typical characteristics of a 
lexical  item  or  linguistic  expression;  quantity,  or  the  amount  of  iconic  mental 
materials that suffices for identification;   and  the  degree  of  schematisation  to 
which the materials are to be abstracted in any given context. The concept of the 
‘black swan’ is given as an example.  
 
Concept 
Black swan (Chenopsis atratus) 
Concept: Interiorized regulatory principle of iconic perceptual materials controlled by the speech 
community via pedagogy  
                       Concepts regulate iconic materials in 4 distinct ways: 
(1) Directionality: ‘this swan, not the duck over there’. 
(2) Quality (qualia), characteristic properties ‘This black, white and red swan’. 
(3) Quantity (quanta), dimensions of properties: ‘This swan with lots of black, a little white under the wings, 
and a red beak’. 
(4) Degree of schematisation: from detailed, realist iconic Vorstellung of an Australian swan to genus and 
species abstraction and full formalisation ‘x’.   
 
Natural  kind  concepts  cannot  of  course  stand  in  for  all  concepts  available  in 
language. We need to distinguish at least between formal concepts arrived at by a 
series of reductions of their natural language ingredients. I call them ‘hard-edged’ 
concepts because they are governed by definition and behave like members of a 
fully defined, formal set. On their own, they enter into purely formal relations in 
various formal systems, such as in chemical codes, symbolic logic, various systems of 
mathematics, and such formal languages as FORTRAN or PASCAL. I distinguish them  
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from ‘soft-edged’ concepts of the kind we find in philosophical and other theoretical 
discourses.  Although,  they  can  be  presented  in  the  context  of  definitional 
descriptions, such descriptions remain open to interpretation; hence the metaphor 
of a soft descriptive boundary. Lastly, I suggest the term ‘soft-core’  concepts  as 
typical for the vast bulk of natural language signifieds. (Cf. CP 5.251) This phrasing 
accounts  for  historical  semantic  drift  and  the  shifting  conceptuality  of  natural 
language as an effect of differences of class, gender, as well as religious, political or 
ideological leanings. I sum up the three types of concepts as follows.      
 
Types of concepts 
Concept  as  rule  for  mental  material  contents:  from  formal  to  iconic  perceptual 
concepts 
Type  Definition and examples  Explicit 
reference  
explicit 
deixis 
 
Implicit 
reference 
implicit  
deixis 
‘hard-edged’  Formal concepts strictly 
determined by definition: x=yⁿ; 
270◦; C6H12O6; 
x=y→(y=z → x=z); ≤; ≡; €.  
Also includes fully defined 
technical terms: ‘hydroxiapatite’ 
Nil  neutralised  Nil  Nil 
‘soft-edged’  Theoretical concepts which are 
dependent on natural language: 
‘body without organs’ (Deleuze, 
Guattari); ‘ontic-ontological 
difference’ (Heidegger); 
‘atomistic concept’ (Fodor); 
‘Anschauung’ (Kant). 
in need of 
interpretation 
reduced  background of 
philosophical 
paradigm 
Philosophical 
enunciative 
position  
‘soft-core’  concepts of natural languages 
which order iconic perceptual 
contents of Vorstellung: ‘run’, 
‘sing’, ‘strong’, ‘blue’, 
‘interesting’; ‘home’ ‘democracy’, 
Essential  essential  essential  Essential  
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‘difficulty’, ‘belief’, ‘hope’. 
 
 
 
Next I address metaphor which, I suggest, plays an exceptionally important role in 
natural language, partly for the reasons explored by Jacques Derrida in ‘The Retreat 
of Metaphor’ (Derrida 1978) and partly for the way metaphor lays bare the iconic 
mechanisms which I am claiming are an essential process in the event of meaning 
making in natural language in general. A schematic analysis of the following well-
canvassed metaphor is given to shore up my claim.   
 
Metaphor 
Verbal metaphor: ‘my husband is a pig’  
Phases of the meaning process 
 
Phase 1 
 
Transformation of the speech sounds into Vorstellung: verbal to nonverbal 
  Husband – pig    ------->  auditory, visual, olfactory, kinetic transformations 
 
Phase 2 
 
Unfolding of distinct contents of Vorstellung: heterosemiotically iconic  
specific husband behaviours, duties, household performance, etc. 
specific smells, looks, sounds, behaviour of pigs 
Separate  qualitative  und  quantitative  contents  of  Vorstellung  and  emotive 
responses 
 
Phase 3 
Mixing of contents of Vorstellung:  intersemiotic, nonverbal combination of two separately imagined 
worlds into a unified new world in which imagined husband and pig behaviour are inextricably linked. 
Qualitative und quantitative contents of Vorstellung und emotive responses are combined 
into a coherent, negative, contemptible overall mental scenario and emotional stance. 
 
Phase 4 
 
Transformation of nonverbal overall Vorstellung (phase 3) into language expressions (paraphrase): 
  ‘My husband is a despicable person whose behaviour can only be described as swinish’. 
  (Note: What occurs in the generation of meaning in metaphor is no more or less than a protracted 
and more elaborate version of the typical meaning processes in natural language in general. The 
dictionary consists of a verbal starting point (phase 1) and the final result (phase 4) and so cannot 
contain any meanings at all.   
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Turning now to the highly contested notion of linguistic meaning, I first want to 
provide a list of definitions of meaning as it can be gleaned from the literature. I do 
so  in  order  to  sharpen  the  contrast  between  traditional  approaches  to  natural 
language semantics, pragmatics and the kind of perspective advocated in this paper. 
Given  the  brevity  of  the  ‘definitions’  offered  in  the  list  below,  they  should  be 
regarded as no more than rough indications of the semantic positions actually held 
by  the  writers  with  which  I  associate  them.  Meaning  has  been  understood  as 
essence  divorced  from  the  referent  and  wedded  to  the  word  (Aristotle);  as  an 
organising, social rule (Kant), as the designation of an object (Mill), the pure thought 
of definitional sense (Frege), as iconic interpretant (Peirce), an effect of differential 
syntactic  relations  (Saussure),  eidos  (Husserl),  typification  (Schutz),  reference 
(Russell), use (Wittgenstein), interpretation (Heidegger), definite ideality (Cassirer),  
a  constant  amongst  diverging  intentional  objects  (Carnap),  tacit  agreement 
(Polanyi),  as  synonymy  and  significance  (Quine);  an  effect  of  non-linguistic 
contextual  relations  (Bateson),  as  link  between  language  and  world  (Devitt  and 
Sterelny),  enunciatively  modalised  ‘statement’  (Foucault),    deferral  as  the 
dissolution  of  signifieds  into  endless  chains  of  signifiers  (Derrida),  association  of 
propositions and states of affairs at infinite speed (Deleuze), strictly literal sense of a 
sentence (Davidson), truth-condition (Wiggins), a result of mutual perspective-taking 
(Habermas), discursive injustice (Lyotard), and as simulacrum (Baudrillard). 
By contrast, in a perceptually oriented theory of natural language meaning can 
be redefined thus.  
Linguistic  meaning is the  event  of the  activation  of an  empty, verbal  expression 
(linguistic signifier) by a motivated signified made up of a concept and a cluster of 
iconic readings regulated by the concept in terms of directionality, kind, quantity, 
and degree of schematisation, under community guidance.   
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Extending this redefinition to the level of general language use, we could say 
that  linguistic  performance  is  the  culture  sanctioned  way  in  which  schematised, 
nonverbal iconic materials are typically associated with linguistic signifiers for the 
purpose of meaning.  
A  similar  attempt  at  redefining  reference  likewise  yields  a  quite  different 
notion from those available in the various traditions of linguistic descriptions. Again I 
start with a rough summary of competing definitions. Reference has been described 
as the designation by a general term of an empirical object (Frege), the semiotic, 
iconic  identification  of  an  object  (Peirce),  an  intersyntactic  relation  (Saussure), 
identification of an actual object by a referring expression (Russell), an indicated 
intentional object (Husserl), referring use (Strawson), a relation involving naming, 
truth,  and  denotation  (Quine),  naming  of  an  intended  salient  object  (Evans), 
baptisement of an object by way of a rigid designator (Kripke), the relation between 
language and what it stands for (Lyons), an effect of a network of names (Lyotard), 
and as a matching of language and a socially agreed upon object (Fauconnier). 
From a perceptual, iconic perspective, reference can now be redefined as the 
linguistic  designation  of  a  specific,  intersemiotically  and  heterosemiotically, 
nonverbally overdetermined and so constituted object.  
In light of the strong significatory emphasis in this formulation, it is important to add 
the  caution  that  this  in  no  way  denies  a  mind-independent  ‘reality’.  Expressed 
positively,  the  redefinition  of  reference  in  this  manner  permits  a  post-Kantian 
position according to which universal constraints ‘shine through’ our descriptions of 
necessity. Error is always possible, but appears to be exposed sooner or later by 
universal ‘deep’ constraints. This version of semiotic fallibility also allows for non-
error, rather than ‘truth’, as exemplified by descriptions which have not so far fallen 
foul of inferable universal limits. 
Reference, as discussed widely in the philosophical and linguistic literature, 
however fails to tell the richer story of the kind of referring acts we perform when  
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we use natural language. What is starkly absent is what I have termed ‘referential 
background’.  It  shows  itself  in  the  bulk  of  expressions  of  natural  languages  but 
cannot  be  captured  if  we  describe  language  in  the  manner  initiated  by  Frege, 
Saussure or Husserl. While Frege convincingly identified the reference of ‘morning 
star’ and ‘evening star’ as the planet Venus, he failed to notice that we wouldn’t 
understand either ‘morning star’ or ‘evening star’ if we did not have access, by way 
of perception and Vorstellung, to typical mornings, typical evenings and the kind of 
lights we see in the night sky. The reason why it never occurred to him that such 
considerations  might  be  important  for  the  characterisation  of  language  was 
probably the fact that in his opening examples of geometrical and arithmetic signs, 
referential  background  played  no  role  whatsoever.  Yet,  the  transference  of  this 
absence to the analysis of natural language can be identified as a fundamental flaw 
in his approach. Here referential background is of the essence. The consequences of 
this specific oversight have been as little noticed as they have been devastating for a 
rich description of natural language. 
Much the same can be said about standard accounts of deixis, reference to the 
speaker and speech situation, in philosophical parlance sometimes addressed under 
the topic of ‘egocentric particulars’ (Russell ) or ‘occasion meaning’ (Husserl). The 
major drawback of such standard descriptions is that they only deal with explicit 
deixis, that is, with deixis that is actually spelt out in a sentence, such as by temporal 
and spatial markers, pronouns referring back to the speaker and other such devices. 
What fails to be addressed in this kind of surface description of deixis is what I have 
called implicit or cultural deixis, or the manner in which a culture typically speaks its 
signifiers. To illustrate the point, let me return to my earlier example of ‘guanxi’. If 
we  accept  my  rough  translation  of  ‘connections’  with  the  implication  of  ‘the 
cultivation  of  personal  relationships  based  on  trust’,  its  implicit  deixis  differs 
noticeably  depending  on  whether  it  is  viewed  from  a  Chinese  or  Western 
perspective.  Whereas  the  signifier  is  typically  imbued  in  Chinese  with  a positive  
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tinge as part of its meaning, from a Western perspective ‘guanxi’ tends to invoke 
such negative aspects as deviance and corruption. Nor can one brush this difference 
aside  by  pointing  to  ‘connotations’  or  other modifications  of  a  central  meaning. 
Implicit deixis in this case, as in the totality of any natural language, accompanies all 
expressions as the modal shadow of their propositional contents. The members of a 
language community have simply learned the appropriate manner of speaking its 
terms, as part of their semantic-pragmatic traing.  
Without the activation of signifiers by quasi-perceptual, iconic materials under 
conceptual constraints of the kind described earlier, the realisation of implicit deixis, 
the ‘enunciative shadow’ of language, could not occur. While native language users 
perform these  meaning making  acts habitually, in problematic speech  situations, 
poetry, and especially translation, when the semantic-pragmatic process is slowed 
down, the hypothesis of language as ‘a set of rules for imagining and acting in the 
world’ is borne out. For without playing with various quasi-perceptual scenarios in 
Vorstellung it would not be possible to arrive at satisfying meaning results.   
Lastly,  any  attempt  at  reviving  the  theorisation  of  natural  language  by 
recourse to perception and its variations in Vorstellung must be wary of the traps of 
mentalism and subjectivism. If,  as has  been argued, mental iconic  materials  and 
their  transformations  are  a  necessary  part  of  linguistic  meaning,  then  does  the 
argument not fall foul of the traditional demand that meaning must be public? And 
in what way can a theory of language and meaning that advocates so emphatically 
the role of iconicity in consciousness reconcile its necessary mental operations with 
public meanings? The answer is that in this case we can have our cake and eat it by 
introducing  the  notion  of  sufficient  semiosis  as  part  of  the  public  pedagogy  of 
language  acquisition.  In  other  words,  the  kinds  of  mental  operations  or  acts  of 
Vorstellung we perform in the event of meaning making are public in the sense that 
the  speech  community  has  taught  us  the  rules  of  engagement.  Meanings  are 
typically constituted in more or less the same manner. Identity of meaning is neither  
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needed nor possible. Having acquired the constraints of sufficient semiosis means 
that a native language speaker knows when an exchange of linguistic signs has been 
successful,  should  be  continued  for  clarification,  or  terminated  as  unpromising. 
Accordingly, sufficient semiosis operates as the broad brush monitoring system by 
which  a  speech  community  regulates  its  ongoing  language  use.  With  respect  to 
analytical  theories  of  language,  sufficient  semiosis  replaces  ‘truth-conditions’. 
(Wiggins 1992) While truth-conditional semantics still hankers after the regulative 
role of ‘truth’, in a perceptually oriented theory ‘truth’ does have its reduced place, 
but not as a measure of meaning. In socially and culturally complex semiosis, truth-
conditions  fail  to  deliver  the  promised  goods.  In  contrast,  sufficient  semiosis  is 
designed to handle all language use, simple, complex, realist, fictional, technical and 
formal. 
 
Conclusion 
At this point in the paper, it will not come as a surprise to the reader when I say that 
these redefinitions cannot be accepted without serious consequences for linguistics 
and the philosophy of language, as well as for disciplines that rely on their findings. 
By  way  of  conclusion,  let  me  indicate  the  sort  of  implications  the  perceptual 
language  programme  has  for  some  influential  theories  of  language.  If  the  iconic 
operations  canvassed  here  are  indeed  necessary  acts  for  the  constitution  of 
linguistic  meaning,  then  the  various  speech  act  observations  made  by  the 
phenomenologist  Adolf  Reinach  in  1913,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  in  1953  and  soon 
afterwards in John Austin’s full blown speech act theory, (1962) in its extension in 
John Searle’s Speech Acts (1977) and illocutionary acts (1976), as well as later work 
on ‘whimperatives’, need to be reviewed. Austin’s notion of ‘locution’ could not get 
to first base if the iconic, step-by-step activation of its signifiers by nonverbal signs 
had not already facilitated its constitution, while ‘illocution’ and ‘perlocution’ can 
only be the result of additional and more elaborate inferential nonverbal semiosis.  
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Likewise, Vorstellung is a necessary precondition of Paul Grice’s arguments on 
presuppositions  and  implicature.  (Grice  1989)  Presuppositions  can  indeed  be 
construed along the lines of propositional abstraction, but before we can do so, we 
have to be able to imagine the kind of human social scenario that is encoded in 
linguistic  expressions.  And  if  such  acts  of  Vorstellung  are  indeed  a  necessary 
condition for the construction of meaning as interpretive event, then the procedures 
proposed so elegantly by Grice turn out to be can-rules rather than must-rules in the 
theorisation  of  natural  language.  In  any  case,  the  iconic  work  of  meaning 
construction has both logical and chronological priority. 
It would be churlish not to applaud Jacques Derrida for having extended two 
of Kant’s profound insights about the empirical concepts of natural language: ‘the 
limits of the concept are never assured’ and ‘the analysis of my concept is always in 
doubt’. (CPR 728) Much of Derrida’s early work and especially his contribution of 
such ‘infrastructures’ as ‘differance’, ‘metaphoricity’, ‘supplementarity’, etc. can be 
read  as  an  elaboration  of  the  reasons  why  Kant’s  observations  are  still  cogent. 
However,  in  spite  of  this  and  other  achievements,  as  well  as  Derrida’s  avowed 
admiration for Peirce, his own writings can quite rightly be accused of the sin of 
‘verbocentrism’,  because  they  fail  to  account  for  iconicity  in  language. 
Unfortunately,  Derrida  was  not  able  to  distance  himself  sufficiently  from  his 
Saussurean heritage. One might add, that much the same can be said of French 
feminist writings desperately trying to get the body back into language, but failing to 
do so because they remain trapped in a post-Saussurean conception of the linguistic 
sign. (Irigaray 1977; Cixous 1997) The exception here is Julia Kristeva who, in her 
non-linguistic writings, has embraced corporeality as an essential feature of human 
semiosis. (Kristeva 1989) In Ernesto Laclau’s work, the idea of ‘empty signifiers’ have 
led him to the boundaries of language, which in true structuralist fashion he equates 
with the much broader boundaries of human semiosis in general. Not only would 
‘empty  signifiers’  be  dysfunctional  in  natural  language,  they  would  not  even  be  
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recognized as language in the non-technical sense. (Laclau 1996:36-46) Last, and 
least, I need  to  mention Jean Baudrillard whose fatality of  meaning  has little  to 
contribute  to  the  theorisation  of  language  except  a  certain  rhetorical  force. 
(Baudrillard  1983)  Unfortunately  for  Baudrillard,  his  very  own  political  goals  of 
‘resistance’ are terminated before they can get off the ground by his denial of the 
kind  of  iconic  acts  we  perform  of  necessity  when  we  make  meaning by  way  of 
language.  
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